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Abstract
The decoy-state scheme is the most widely implemented quantum key distribution protocol in
practice. In order to account for the finite-size key effects on the achievable secret key genera-
tion rate, a rigorous statistical fluctuation analysis is required. Originally, a heuristic Gaussian-
approximation technique was used for this purpose, which, despite of its analytical convenience,
was not sufficiently rigorous. The fluctuation analysis has recently been made rigorous by using
the Chernoff bound. There is a considerable gap, however, between the key rate bounds obtained
from these new techniques and that obtained from the Gaussian assumption. Here, we develop
a tighter bound for the decoy-state method, which yields a smaller failure probability. This im-
provement results in a higher key rate and increases the maximum distance over which secure key
exchange is possible. By optimizing the system parameters, our simulation results show that our
new method almost closes the gap between the two previously proposed techniques and achieves a
similar performance to that of conventional Gaussian approximations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In theory, quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] has been proven to be information-
theoretically secure against eavesdropping attacks [3–5], even if we assume that the attacker,
Eve, has full control over the channel. The security of QKD stems from the complementary
relation of non-commuting measurement operators in quantum mechanics [6]. Due to the
uncertainty principle, any Eve’s interference that gains her some information about the key
would inevitably introduce disturbance. The users, Alice and Bob, can then bound the
information leakage to Eve by quantifying the disturbance. The latter requires collecting
data from which certain parameters of the system, such as bit and phase error probabilities
[5], can accurately be estimated.
In practice, the required probabilities above cannot be directly measured. Instead, one
can only measure the rates, i.e., the frequencies of occurrence. If the QKD system runs for
an infinitely long time, the rates will converge to the corresponding underlying probabilities.
That is, the parameters needed for data postprocessing can be measured accurately when the
data size is sufficiently large. In reality, there are deviations between rates and probabilities
due to statistical fluctuations. A finite-key analysis accounts for these deviations and derives
a security parameter, the failure probability, for the final key. With the aid of the finite-key
analysis, the security of QKD can also be extended to its composable security definition
[7, 8]. The finite-key analysis of QKD systems with idealized single-photon sources and
detectors are well studied in the literature [9]. Here, we develop tight bounds for the secret
key rate in practical scenarios when decoy states are in use [10–12].
A perfect single-photon source is hard to attain in practice. Alternatively, a highly
attenuated laser, described by a weak coherent state, is widely used in QKD. The multi-
photon components in the coherent state would introduce security loopholes in practice
[13, 14]. Such imperfections in realistic devices were originally taken into consideration in
the Gottesman-Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) security analysis [15]. By directly applying
the GLLP analysis to the coherent-state QKD system, however, the performance, measured
by key rate and maximum secure transmission distance, is rather limited [16]. A clever twist
to the weak-laser QKD, known as the decoy-state method, is introduced in [10–12], which,
fortunately, can enhance system performance to a level comparable to that of a perfect
single-photon source. The decoy-state method is now widely used in QKD systems [17–22].
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In the decoy-state method, we estimate the channel parameters by sending two types of
states. One is called the signal state, which is used to transmit keys similar to the single-
photon source in the ideal situation. The other is called the decoy state, which is used
to characterize the channel, by estimating the number of single-photon states traversing
the channel. In the information-theoretical security proof of the decoy-state method [11],
these two states have the same properties except for their intensity, which results in distinct
Poisson distributions for their photon number. Note that the phases of the coherent states
must be randomized, in order that the source can be treated as a statistical mixture of
Fock states. In this case, the channel, controlled by Eve, will have the same impact on the
single-photon components in both signal and decoy states. The channel parameters, such as
the probability of a single photon passing through, defined as the single-photon yield, would
then be the same for the signal and decoy states. This property is at the core of the security
of the decoy-state technique. We revisit this condition in our finite-key analysis.
Estimating the channel parameters, such as the single-photon yield, would become less
accurate when one only has a finite set of data. Statistical fluctuation must then be con-
sidered, in our security analysis, to account for possible deviations from true (probability)
values. It turns out that the statistical fluctuation analysis for the decoy-state method can be
a complicated problem. To simplify the problem, a Gaussian distribution assumption on the
channel fluctuations was made in early analyses [23]. Throughout the paper, we refer to this
Gaussian approximation technique by the Gaussian analysis method. Such an assumption is
not necessarily justified when one considers a rigorous security proof. Lately, this Gaussian
assumption was removed from the security proof by applying the Chernoff bound and the
Hoeffding inequality [24, 25]. We refer to this latter technique by the Chernoff+Hoeffding
method.
The simulation results show that a large-size key is required to achieve a secure key
with the Chernoff+Hoeffding method and the key rate is lower than that of the Gaussian
analysis method. In this work, we improve the finite-key analysis method and provide a
tighter estimation of QKD parameters by breaking the parameter estimation problem into
different regimes of operation and finding tight bounds in each case. After optimizing the
system parameters, we show that our improved finite-key analysis method achieves a similar
performance to the Gaussian analysis method.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Sec. II, we review the commonly used
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vacuum+weak decoy-state scheme [23, 26] and develop a general formulation for its finite-
key analysis. In Sec. III, we present our new statistical fluctuation method, and provide
instructions on how our results can be applied to a realistic experimental setup. Note that
our proposed method is generic and can also be used in other decoy-state QKD schemes. In
Sec. IV, we first construct a QKD simulation model with typical experimental parameters,
and then compare our new method with previous work when each method has been optimized
to offer its best performance. We discuss the results and conclude the paper in Sec. V.
II. FINITE-KEY ANALYSIS FOR VACUUM+WEAK DECOY-STATE SCHEME
In this section, we lay out a precise formulation for our finite-key analysis problem in
the special case of vacuum+weak decoy-state protocol. This turns out to offer a unifying
language, applicable to both the Chernoff+Hoeffding [24, 25] and the Gaussian analysis
methods, as well as our own proposed method. We will then compare the new formulation
with that of the Gaussian analysis method [23], and show how the results there can be
employed in our finite-key analysis. In particular, we show that the formulation in the
Chernoff+Hoeffding method has an equivalent form to that of the Gaussian analysis method.
In the following, in Sec. IIA, we review the widely-used scheme of vacuum+weak decoy-state
QKD [26]. Then, the definitions and notations used in this paper are given. In Sec. II B,
we formulate the parameter estimation problem in its general form. Finally, in Sec. IIC, we
use the results in [23] to find analytical bounds for the parameters of interest.
A. Vacuum+weak decoy-state protocol
The vacuum+weak decoy-state protocol, first presented in 2004 [26], is a widely used
decoy-state scheme. In this protocol, Alice encodes the pulses with three different intensities,
corresponding to vacuum states, weak decoy states and the signal states. This scheme is
capable of estimating the single-photon components because, intuitively, when the intensity
of a coherent state pulse is very weak, the resulting detection events mainly come from
the single-photon components and background. The yield of the background noise can be
estimated by the vacuum decoy state. By combining measurement results of weak decoy and
vacuum decoy states, the relevant parameters to the single-photon components, including
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the yield and quantum bit error rate (QBER), can accurately be estimated. With those
parameters, secure keys can be obtained from the signal states after postprocessing.
The protocol is described in more detail in the following steps:
1. State preparation: For each bit in her raw key, Alice randomly chooses the intensity
and the basis to encode her bit. She can choose from three intensities, namely, vacuum
state, weak decoy state and signal state, and then randomly encode her bit in the X
or Z basis, and sends it to Bob. The probability of choosing the Z basis could, in
general, be different from that of the X basis [27].
2. Measurement : Bob measures the received states in the X or Z basis chosen randomly.
The probability of choosing a measurement basis is the same as that of the encoding
stage.
3. Sifting : Over an authenticated channel, Alice announces the basis and signal/decoy
information she has used, while Bob announces the locations of valid detections and
the bases used for his measurements. If Alice and Bob have chosen the same basis,
they keep the corresponding bits as the sifted key.
4. Error correction and verification: Alice calculates some parity information of her sifted
key, encrypts the parity bits with pre-shared secure keys, and sends them to Bob. Bob
then performs the error correction and, Alice and Bob verify if their keys are now
identical [9]. If the verification fails they perform the error correction again or abort
the protocol. If the keys are verified to be identical, Bob finds the number of bit errors
and evaluates the QBER.
5. Parameter estimation: Using the parameters obtained in the experiment, a lower
bound on the number of successful detection events resulted from single-photon com-
ponents of the signal states,Ms1 , and an upper bound on the corresponding phase error
rate, eps1 , will be obtained in each basis. The latter quantifies the leaked information
to a potential eavesdropper.
6. Privacy amplification: Alice and Bob apply universal hashing function based on the
parameters Ms1 and e
ps
1 in each basis. Then, according to the GLLP analysis [15], a
shorter but more secure key can be extracted with a length of Ms1 [1− h(eps1 )].
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The final key length in each basis is then lower bounded by
K ≥Ms1 [1− h(eps1 )]−Kec,
Kec = M
sfh(Es),
(1)
where f denotes the inefficiency of error correction, and h(x) = −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x)
is the Shannon binary entropy function. Here, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that
Alice and Bob only extract secure keys from the signal states. In principle, they can also
extract secure keys from the decoy states as well. The other parameters in Eq. (1) are
defined below.
Below, the notation used throughout the paper, including the parameters in Eq. (1), is
presented.
1. The superscripts x and z denote the X and Z bases, respectively. For brevity of
notation, we often do not explicitly mention the basis superscript, unless otherwise
needed. All parameters defined below are then for a certain fixed basis γ = x, z,
although the superscript γ is not shown.
2. Capital letters K, N , and M , respectively, denote the number of the final key bits,
the pulses sent by Alice and the valid, after basis sifting, detections on Bob’s side.
3. Q denotes the gain, i.e., the rate of creating a sifted key bit, and E denotes the total
QBER in the sifted key bit.
4. Yi denotes the yield of i-photon states, and is given by Yi ≡Mi/Ni, where the subscript
i for M and N refers to the corresponding counts for i-photon states.
5. ei denotes the error rate corresponding to the transmission of i-photon states. Note
that it should not be confused with the letter e without the subscript, which is the
base of the natural logarithm.
6. The superscripts s, w and v, respectively, denote the signal state with intensity µ, weak
decoy state with intensity ν (< µ), and vacuum state. The superscript/subscript
a denotes these three cases, i.e., a ∈ {s, w, v}, with corresponding intensity µa ∈
{µ, ν, 0}.
7. The superscripts b and p refer to bit and phase (in error-rate terms), respectively.
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8. The superscripts L and U refer to the lower bound and the upper bound, respectively.
9. qa ≡ Na/N denotes the rate Alice encodes a state with intensity µa.
10. On Alice’s side, pai denotes the conditional probability that an i-photon state corre-
sponds to a coherent pulse with intensity µa, i.e.,
pai ≈
Nai
Ni
, (2)
where the approximation is caused by statistical fluctuations. The approximation
becomes equality in the asymptotic (infinite-key) limit. Due to the Poisson distribution
of the photon numbers in different states and Na = qaN , these probabilities are given
by,
pai =
Nae−µa(µa)i/i!∑
α∈{s,w,v}N
αe−µα(µα)i/i!
,
=
qae−µa(µa)i/i!∑
α∈{s,w,v} q
αe−µα(µα)i/i!
.
(3)
Note that pai is the only probability term used in this paper. All other terms are rates,
i.e., the ratio between two counts.
B. Statistical fluctuation analysis: Formulation
Our key objective in the statistical fluctuation analysis of the decoy-state schemes is to
bound Ms1 and e
ps
1 , by allowing a certain failure rate, by using the measurement results
obtained in a QKD round. A QKD round consists of transmitting N pulses by Alice, out
of which K key bits are to be extracted. In this subsection and next, all the terms refer to
the parameters in a particular basis, e.g., the Z basis. The same results hold for the other
basis as well. In each QKD round, Alice and Bob can specify Ma and EaMa for different
values of a. Based on these measurement results, they consider a worst-case scenario by
finding the minimum value of Ms1 and the maximum value of e
ps
1 that is consistent with the
measurement results.
From the GLLP security analysis [15], Eve cannot get any key information from the single-
photon states without introducing disturbance, while she can in principle get information
about the key when multiple photons are sent, say, via photon-number-splitting attacks
[13, 14]. Eve’s objective is then to minimize Ms1 , within the constraints of the decoy-state
scheme.
7
Note that some parameters, such as Ni and Mi are, in principle, known to Eve assuming
that she can perform non-demolition measurements on the signals generated by Alice. From
Alice and Bob’s perspective, these variables are, however, unknown, but have a fixed value
in each round of the QKD protocol once Bob’s measurements are completed. On the other
hand, the choice of a for each transmitted state is known to Alice, while Eve has no infor-
mation about that before the sifting stage. This is the key advantage that Alice and Bob
have over Eve in specifying the range of values that the key parameters of interest would
take. In the following, we will try to find relationships between the measurable parameters
Ma and EaMa and the unknown (to Alice and Bob), but fixed, parameters Mi. We will
then show how this can help us bound Ms1 and e
ps
1 .
For phase-randomized coherent sources, the state prepared by Alice can be considered
as a mixture of Fock states. The channel, controlled by Eve, behaves the same to different
Fock states. This is called the photon number channel model [28]. For an i-photon state, the
conditional detection probability for Bob that the originally encoded state has an intensity
µa is the same as the probability chosen by Alice, p
a
i , defined in Eq. (2). This implies that
Mai ≈ paiMi,
eaiM
a
i ≈ pai eiMi,
(4)
where the approximation becomes equality in the asymptotic case.
The total number of detection events caused by the state a,Ma, and the number of errors,
EaMa, are given by contributions from states with different numbers of photons, that is
Ma =
∑
i
Mai
EaMa =
∑
i
eaiM
a
i .
(5)
Therefore, by substituting Eq. (4) into Eq. (5), we obtain
Ms ≈ ps0M0 + · · ·+ psiMi + . . . ,
Mw ≈ pw0M0 + · · ·+ pwi Mi + . . . ,
Mv ≈ pv0M0,
EsMs ≈ ps0e0M0 + · · ·+ psieiMi + . . . ,
EwMw ≈ pw0 e0M0 + · · ·+ pwi eiMi + . . . ,
EvMv ≈ pv0e0M0,
(6)
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where the approximation becomes equality in the asymptotic case. Note that the terms on
the left hand side of Eq. (6) are measurable counts, while the ones on the right hand side are
mixed with probabilities. When the data size is finite, the statistical fluctuation may lead to
deviations between Mai (e
a
iM
a
i ) and p
a
iMi (p
a
i eiMi), in Eq. (4), and similarly in Eq. (6). Our
objective is to bound these deviations while meeting a certain failure rate for the protocol,
as we show next.
The key idea that we use to bound the right-hand side of Eq. (6) is to use the fact that
Eve does not know the type of the states used by Alice. While Eve can control the values
of Mi, for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , she cannot change them after Bob’s measurements. Nevertheless,
even for fixed values of Mi, she cannot exactly predict the measurement results M
a and
EaMa. That is, before the sifting stage, these variables can be considered to be random.
It turns out, however, that the expectation value of these random variables, as we show
next, can be written as a weighted sum of Mis. That is, after Bob’s measurements, Eve can
no longer change these mean values either. From Alice and Bob’s point of view, a set of
observed values for Ma and EaMa would correspond to a fixed, but unknown, set of values
for Mi. Using proper techniques, they can then bound the above expectation values as a
function of the observed values.
Let us first look at Mai in a more detailed way. Before the sifting stage, but after Bob’s
measurements, Mi has a fixed value, but M
a
i is random to Eve. We can then rewrite M
a
i as
follows
Mai =
Mi∑
j=1
χai,j, (7)
where
χai,j =
 1 with probability pai0 with probability 1− pai , j = 1, . . . ,Mi, (8)
are independent and identically distributed indicator random variables. It will then follow
that
E[Mai ] = p
a
iMi,
E[eaiM
a
i ] = p
a
i eiMi,
(9)
where E[·] is the expectation value with respect to χai,j variables. Finally, from Eqs. (5) and
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(9) we find
E[Ms] = ps0M0 + · · ·+ psiMi + . . . ,
E[Mw] = pw0M0 + · · ·+ pwi Mi + . . . ,
E[Mv] = pv0M0,
E[EsMs] = ps0e0M0 + · · ·+ psieiMi + . . . ,
E[EwMw] = pw0 e0M0 + · · ·+ pwi eiMi + . . . ,
E[EvMv] = pv0e0M0,
(10)
where, again, the expectation values are taken with respect to χai,j variables. Note that
these expectation values would represent the average values for our observables from Eve’s
perspective before the sifting stage, but after Bob’s measurements. At this stage, Alice
and Bob can safely assume that Eve can no longer change the values of Mi variables on
the right-hand side of the above equations. The measured values for Ma and E
aMa will
then set some constraints on the expectation values in Eq. (10), and, correspondingly, the
right-hand side of the above equations. In particular, we can show that for any set of values
for observables Ma (E
aMa), we can find lower and upper bounds for their corresponding
expected values, respectively, denoted by EL[Ma] (EL[EaMa]) and EU [Ma] (EU [EaMa]).
Our finite-key analysis can then be formulated as the following optimization problem: Find
min M1, s.t.,
E
L[Ms] ≤ ps0M0 + · · ·+ psiMi + · · · ≤ EU [Ms]
E
L[Mw] ≤ pw0M0 + · · ·+ pwi Mi + · · · ≤ EU [Mw]
E
L[Mv] ≤ pv0M0 ≤ EU [Mv] and
max e1M1, s.t.,
E
L[EsMs] ≤ ps0e0M0 + · · ·+ psieiMi + · · · ≤ EU [EsMs]
E
L[EwMw] ≤ pw0 e0M0 + · · ·+ pwi eiMi + · · · ≤ EU [EwMw]
E
L[EvMv] ≤ pv0e0M0 ≤ EU [EvMv].
(11)
In Sec. III, starting with the Chernoff bound, we show how the required lower and upper
bounds above can be related to the measured observables. Before doing that, however, let
us find the correspondence between the above formulation and that of the previous work in
[23].
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C. Correspondence with Gaussian Analysis Method
In order to compare our formulation in sec. II B with that of the Gaussian analysis
method proposed in [23], we rewrite Eq. (10) by dividing both sides of it by Na. We obtain
the following
E[Qa] = E[
Ma
Na
] =
E[Ma]
Na
=
∞∑
i=0
pai
Mi
Na
=
∞∑
i=0
e−µa(µa)i/i!qa
e−µµi/i!qs + e−ννi/i!qw
Mi
qaN
=
∞∑
i=0
e−µa
(µa)
i
i!
Y ∗i ,
E[EaQa] =
∞∑
i=0
e−µa
(µa)
i
i!
eiY
∗
i .
(12)
Here we implicitly assume that, to her advantage, Na is known to Eve, and
Y ∗i =
Mi
N∞i
,
eiY
∗
i =
eiMi
N∞i
,
(13)
where
N∞i =
e−µµiqs + e−ννiqw + qv0i
i!
N (14)
is the asymptotic limit of Ni when N → ∞. Alternatively, we can think of N∞i as the
expected number of i-photon states sent by Alice. Note that eiY
∗
i should be regarded as one
variable. Equation (12) can be expanded as follows
E[Qs] = e−µY ∗0 + µe
−µY ∗1 +
µ2e−µ
2!
Y ∗2 + · · ·+
µie−µ
i!
Y ∗i + . . .
E[Qw] = e−νY ∗0 + νe
−νY ∗1 +
ν2e−ν
2!
Y ∗2 + · · ·+
νie−ν
i!
Y ∗i + . . .
E[Qv] = Y ∗0
E[EsQs] = e−µe0Y ∗0 + µe
−µe1Y ∗1 +
µ2e−µ
2!
e2Y
∗
2 + · · ·+
µie−µ
i!
eiY
∗
i + . . .
E[EwQw] = e−νe0Y ∗0 + νe
−νe1Y ∗1 +
ν2e−ν
2!
e2Y
∗
2 + · · ·+
νie−ν
i!
eiY
∗
i + . . .
E([EvQv] = e0Y
∗
0 .
(15)
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In order to find the bounds of M1 and e1M1 in our original problem, we find the corre-
sponding bounds for Y ∗1 and e1Y
∗
1 by calculating µ
2eνE[Qw]− ν2eµE[Qs] to obtain
Y ∗1 ≥ Y ∗L1 =
µ
µν − ν2
(
E
L[Qw]eν − EU [Qs]eµ ν
2
µ2
− µ
2 − ν2
µ2
E
U [Qv]
)
,
e1Y
∗
1 ≤ (e1Y ∗1 )U =
E
U [EwQw]− EL[EvQv]e−ν
νe−ν
,
(16)
which results in the following
ML1 = Y
∗L
1 N(e
−µµqs + e−ννqw),
(e1M1)
U = (e1Y
∗
1 )
UN(e−µµqs + e−ννqw),
eU1 =
(e1M1)
U
ML1
=
(e1Y
∗
1 )
U
Y ∗L1
=
E
U [EwQw]eν − EL[EvQv]
Y ∗L1 ν
.
(17)
The interesting point about Eqs. (12) and (15) is that, by some simple substitutions,
they have the same form as Eq. (13) in [23]. In fact, by replacing E[Qa] (E[EaQa]) and
Y ∗i in Eq. (12) with Qνm (EνmQνm) and Yi, we reach to the same result as in Eq. (13)
in [23]. Note that the definitions for Q and Y terms here, in our finite-key analysis, are
slightly different from the definitions given in [23] for the infinite-key scenario. Nevertheless,
the equations look similar, and one can use the analytical results obtained in [23], after
necessary substitution, and recycle them here. For instance, the bounds obtained in Eq. (16)
can directly be obtained from Eqs. (34) and (37) in [23].
Thus far, we have shown that the formulation that we need in either the finite-key analy-
sis here and in [24], or the infinitely-long key case in [23] will both result to solving a similar
optimization problem. That is, once one specifies, in our formulation, the values of EL[Ma],
E
U [Ma], EL[EaMa], and EU [EaMa] in Eq. (11) (or the corresponding values in other for-
mulations), all optimization problems would result in an identical key rate estimation. The
key difference would be in their estimated failure probability. The latter is a function of
how we estimate the lower and upper bounds of the average terms that we need in Eq. (11)
as a function of our observations. In [23], the authors use a heuristic Gaussian assumption,
which is not exact but convenient to use. In [24], the required bounds are obtained by
using Chernoff and Hoeffding inequalities, which are rigorous but a bit too loose in certain
regions. In our work, we obtain tighter bounds for these average terms, which, not only are
rigorous, but also offer higher key rates and/or lower failure probabilities as compared to
the Chernoff+Hoeffding method.
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III. STATISTICAL FLUCTUATION ANALYSIS
In this section, we first provide a step-by-step instruction on how to use our theoretical
results in a real experimental setup. We then summarize all the tools that we have developed
in our statistical fluctuation analysis. The full derivations for each of these tools will appear
in Appendixes A and B.
A. Instructions for experimentalists
Suppose we run a QKD experiment according to the decoy-state scheme, as formulated
here. After sifting and error correction, we will then have certain observables, namely, Maz
and Eaz . The next step in the procedure is to apply sufficient privacy amplification that
guarantees a failure probability below a given threshold ε. In the privacy amplification
procedure, the length of the extracted secure key and hence, the size of the corresponding
universal hashing function are determined by Msz1 and e
psz
1 . Thus we need to estimate these
two parameters before performing privacy amplification. Note that it is common to estimate
the phase error rate epsz1 by using the observed bit error rate e
bsx
1 in its complement basis
[5]. One should, however, account for deviations from the bit error rate value once finite-key
issues are considered [9], as we do here. In this section, we only calculate the length of the
secure key, Kz, extracted from the Z-basis measurements. The key length extracted from
the X basis, Kx, can be obtained similarly and the final key length is given by Kz + Kx.
We assume that all the secure key bits come from the signal states. The final key length,
Kz, is given by
Kz ≥MszL1 [1− h(epszU1 )]−Kszec ,
Kszec = M
szfh(Esz),
(18)
where the lower boundMszL1 and the upper bound e
pszU
1 can be found by taking the following
steps:
1. Calculate Kszec :
The parameters Msz and Esz can be directly obtained in the experiment. The cost of
error correction is Kszec = M
szfh(Esz).
2. Calculate MzL1 and e
bxU
1 :
Use the results of Sec. IIIC to calculate the upper and lower bounds of all the av-
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erage terms in Eq. (11), i.e., EL[Ma], EU [Ma], EL[EaMa], and EU [EaMa] for each
basis. Then use E[Qa] = E[Ma]/Na and E[EaQa]=E[EaMa]/Na to calculate the cor-
responding Q and EQ parameters. Then, use Eqs. (16) and (17) to calculate MzL1 and
ebxU1 .
3. Calculate MszL1 :
Use Eq. (33) in Sec. IIID to calculate MszL1 = χ
L for χ¯ = ps1M
zL
1 .
4. Calculate epszU1 :
Use Eq. (B4) to find epszU1 . In Appendix B, we use the random sampling method to
account for the deviation, θ, between ebx1 and e
psz
1 caused by the finite-key setting in our
problem. The upper bound on ebx1 has already obtained in Step 2. By upper bounding
θ as explained in Appendix B, we can find epszU1 . This will specify the required amount
of privacy amplification in the protocol.
B. Methodology: Key ideas
The first nontrivial step in our instruction list, given in Sec. IIIA, is to calculate lower
and upper bounds for all the average terms of interest. The key idea to solve this problem, in
our case, is to use the Chernoff bound with an inverse formulation. To make this point clear,
in this section, we first review the Chernoff bound in the special case of Bernoulli random
variables and show that why it is relevant to our problem. Then, by rewriting the Chernoff
bound, we find proper candidates for upper and lower bounds of the relevant average terms.
In the end, we comment on the differences between our approach and that of [24].
The Chernoff bound for a set of n independent Bernoulli random variables χi ∈ {0, 1}
can be expressed as follows [29, 30]. For χ =
∑n
i=1 χi and χ¯ = E[χ], we have the following
bounds
Pr[χ > (1 + δL)χ¯] <
[
eδ
L
(1 + δL)1+δL
]χ¯
= g(δL, χ¯), (19)
and
Pr[χ < (1− δU)χ¯] <
[
e−δ
U
(1− δU)1−δU
]χ¯
= g(−δU , χ¯), (20)
where δL > 0, 0 < δU < 1, and g(δ, χ¯) =
[
eδ
(1+δ)1+δ
]χ¯
.
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The above formulation can be applied to Ma and EaMa, whose average values need to
be bounded. For instance, in the data postprocessing step, the total number of detections
obtained by Bob in the Z basis is given by Mz. For each valid detection event, we can
define the indicator random variable χj that determines whether or not Alice has originally
prepared the jth received pulse in the signal state. That is, χj = 1 means that a signal
state has caused the jth detection event, whereas χj = 0 implies that another state (weak
decoy or vacuum state) has been used. Then, the total number of detected signal states is
given by Msz =
∑Mz
j=1 χj, with χj being independent Bernoulli random variables. A similar
formulation can be used for error terms as well. In the rest of this section, the parameter
χ will then represent any of the parameters of interest in the form Ma and EaMa in a
particular basis.
The Chernoff bound in Eqs. (19) and (20) bounds the probability that the observed value
deviates from its average value. That is, if we know the average value of χ, we can define a
confidence interval [χU , χL], where χL = (1 + δL)χ¯ and χU = (1 − δU)χ¯, the probability of
being outside of which is bounded by functions of δL, δU , and χ¯. The problem that we have
in hand is, however, the opposite. We need to bound χ¯ for a given observed value of χ in
such a way that the failure probability is below a certain threshold.
To define the failure probability precisely, we use the same framework that we developed
in Sec. II B in which we showed that after the measurement phase, χ¯ is fixed, but unknown.
Nevertheless, even for a fixed χ¯, the value χ that Alice and Bob observe in their experiment
is a random variable. The failure probability in this setting can then be defined as follows.
For a fixed but unknown value of χ¯, we find the probability that the observed value for χ
results in either of the following events:
Event 1: χ¯ < EL(χ), (21)
where EL(χ) is the procedure/function by which we relate an observed value to the lower
limit on χ¯, and
Event 2: χ¯ > EU(χ), (22)
where EU(χ) is the procedure/function by which we relate an observed value to the upper
limit on χ¯. For instance, the probability of failure corresponding to Event 1 is given by
Pr[Event 1] = Pr[χ¯ < EL(χ)]. (23)
15
Now, in order to bound the above probability, we define our function EL(χ) in such a way
that it satisfies the following condition
Pr[χ > (1 + δL(εL, χ¯))χ¯] = Pr[χ¯ < EL(χ)], (24)
where εL, as we see next, is the failure probability, and we have solved the equation g(δL, χ¯) =
εL in order to write δL as a function of εL and χ¯. The left-hand-side of Eq. (24) is then
equivalent to the left-hand-side of Eq. (19), which will then result in
Pr[Event 1] < εL. (25)
In other words, by choosing EL(χ) in such a way that it satisfies Eq. (24) we can use the
Chernoff bound to bound the failure probability. The same holds if one works out the upper
limit for the average terms with the difference that now one should find EU(χ) such that
Pr[χ > (1− δU(εU , χ¯))χ¯] = Pr[χ¯ < EU(χ)], (26)
with εU being the failure probability for Event 2 and δU(εU , χ¯) is the solution to g(−δU , χ¯) =
εU .
Provided that functions χL = (1 + δL(εL, χ¯))χ¯ and χU = (1 − δU(εU , χ¯)χ¯ are increasing
functions of χ¯, one obvious choice for EL(χ) (EU(χ)) is the inverse function of χL (χU). In
Appendix A, we show that the above monotonicity condition, in fact, holds, and that would
offer a solution to find very tight bounds for all terms of interest.
Our approach offers tighter bounds than the ones proposed in [24]. One reason for the
difference is that, in [24], the authors use looser forms of the Chernoff bound than the ones
we use in Eqs. (19) and (20), especially when χ has small values. But, more importantly,
the procedure for finding EU (χ) in [24] is somehow heuristic, as compared to our exact
calculations, and results in looser upper bounds even in the case of large values of χ. In
our numerical results we show how these differences will result in our improving the bounds,
and correspondingly the failure rate and/or key rate, in the decoy-state QKD setup. In the
rest of this section, we then provide a summary of our analytical results that can be used to
bound relevant terms in our formulation.
C. From χ to χ¯
Given a measurement result χ, we can bound the underlying expectation value χ¯ for a
failure probability bounded by ε = 2εL = 2εU . The results are summarized below and the
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details of calculations are shown in Appendix A.
1. If χ = 0, we use
E
L(χ) = 0,
E
U(χ) = β,
(27)
where β = − ln(ε/2).
2. If χ > 0, we use
E
L(χ) =
χ
1 + δL
,
E
U(χ) =
χ
1− δU ,
(28)
where δL and δU can be obtained by solving the following equations[
eδ
L
(1 + δL)1+δL
] χ
1+δL
=
1
2
ε,
[
e−δ
U
(1− δU)1−δU
] χ
1−δU
=
1
2
ε.
(29)
It turns out that the solutions δL and δU to Eq. (29) are difficult to calculate when χ
is large. A simplified analytical approximation is given next.
3. If χ ≥ 6β, we use
δL = δU =
3β +
√
8βχ+ β2
2(χ− β) (30)
in Eq. (28). This will provide us with a slightly looser bound than the one we can
obtain by solving (29), but the difference is negligible.
D. From χ¯ to χ
Once, using the relationships in Sec. IIIC, EL(χ) and EU (χ) are found for all relevant
parameters χ, we use Eqs. (16) and (17) to calculate MzL1 and e
bxU
1 . In step 3 of the
instruction list, we, however, need to calculate MszL1 . We know that E[M
sz
1 ] = p
sz
1 M
z
1 . In
this section, we will show, using a symmetric form of the Chernoff bound, how to estimate
the value of Msz1 from E[M
sz
1 ].
Let us use our more general notation χ representing the sum of a number of independent
Bernoulli random variables. Msz1 satisfies this condition as written in Eq. (7). Then, we can
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solve the following equation
2e−δ
2χ¯/(2+δ) = ε, (31)
and, using the symmteric form of the Chernoff bound given by [31, 32]
Pr(|χ− χ¯| ≥ δχ¯) ≤ 2e−δ2χ¯/(2+δ), (32)
we obtain a confidence interval [χL, χU ], for which Pr{χ ∈ [χL, χU ]} > 1− ε, where
χL = (1− δ)χ¯,
χU = (1 + δ)χ¯,
δ =
−ln(ε/2) +
√
(ln(ε/2))2 − 8 ln(ε/2)χ¯
2χ¯
.
(33)
In our problem, we have the lower bound for χ¯ = E[Msz1 ] given by p
sz
1 M
zL
1 . We can then
use the relationship for χL above to calculate MszL1 with a failure probability bounded by ε.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide additional insight into our proposed method by numerically
comparing it with the other two methods of Chernoff+Hoefding and the Gaussian analysis.
We compare the three methods in terms of the tightness of their confidence intervals, or
their failure probability, as well as the secret key generation rate and the maximum secure
distance in the finite-key setting.
A. Tightness of the bounds
Here, we compare the two previously proposed methods in [23] and [24] with ours in terms
of bounding the expectation value E[χ], from an observation value χ. For ease of reference, we
have summarized the Gaussian analysis method in Appendix C and the Chernoff+Hoeffding
method [24] in Appendix D. For different methods, we calculate the width of the confidence
interval for a fixed failure probability ε. We define this width as d = (EU [χ] − EL[χ])/2,
which quantifies the tightness of an analysis method. Below, we consider the two extreme
cases of large and small value of χ.
Figure 1 compares the three methods in terms of the width of the confidence interval d for
different failure probabilities when the observed value is rather large. We have normalized
18
the vertical axis by σ =
√
χ, which, for χ→∞, is somehow a measure of standard deviation
for the original random variable. Among the three methods, the Gaussian analysis method
gives the tightest bounds, but that comes at the price of not being able to rigorously bound
the failure rate. Our proposed method almost follows that of the Gaussian curve, while there
is a considerable gap between our method and the Chernoff-Hoeffding one. This implies that
the latter offers looser bounds on the average terms of interest as compared to our proposed
technique.
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FIG. 1. Comparison of the width of the confidence interval versus failure probability for three
methods: the Gaussian analysis (solid), the Chernoff+Hoeffding [24] (dotted), and our new method
(dash-dotted). In each scheme, we find lower and upper bounds for the expectation value E[χ] from
an observed value χ, at a given failure probability and at χ→∞. The vertical axis then represents
(EU [χ]− EL[χ])/(2σ), for σ = √χ.
We also compare the three fluctuation analysis methods from another perspective where
we fix the fluctuation deviations, χ−EL[χ] or EU [χ]−χ, and evaluate the failure probabilities.
The results are shown in Table I. We find that in the Chernoff+Hoeffding method [24], the
failure probability for Event 2, at an identical deviation, is higher than that of Event 1. This
is because, in their formulation, χ − EL[χ] 6= EU [χ] − χ, and their estimate of the upper
bound, EU [χ], is rather loose. For large values of χ, the failure probability for both events
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is the same for our method as well as the Gaussian analysis one. It can be seen that the
failure probability guaranteed by our method is roughly within one order of magnitude of
that of the Gaussian analysis method. Note that, however, in the latter case, the failure
probabilities are not guaranteed and they rely on an underlying Gaussian assumption, which
is not necessarily the case. Table I can then serve as a guideline from which one can specify
the desired failure probability and then quickly estimate the corresponding values for EL[χ]
and EU [χ].
TABLE I. The failure probability as a function of the fluctuation deviations, χ−EL[χ] = EU [χ]−χ
when χ→∞. Here, εG, εC+H , and εnew, respectively, denote the sum failure probability for Events
1 and 2 for the Gaussian analysis, the Chernoff+Hoeffding method [24], and our new method.
Deviation εG εC+H εnew
3σ 10−2.56 10−0.57 10−1.65
5σ 10−6.24 10−1.90 10−5.12
7σ 10−11.59 10−3.90 10−10.33
9σ 10−18.64 10−6.57 10−17.28
Our method is particularly attractive when the observed counts are small. As shown in
Figure 2, we compare our method with the Gaussian analysis, at a fixed failure probability
of ε = 10−10, in terms of lower and upper bounds on the expectation value E[χ] when the
observed value for χ is small. When estimating the upper bound, the Gaussian analysis is
always tighter than our new method. When χ→ 0, the upper bound of the Gaussian analysis
is 0 and that of our new method is 23.7190, which is equal to the value of β at ε = 10−10.
Our method, nevertheless, offers a tighter estimation of the lower bound for χ < 2257. In
comparison with the Chernoff+Hoeffding method, our method offers a substantial advantage
in the sense that our required deviations are optimized by solving Eq. 29, whereas in the
Chernoff+Hoeffding method the deviations are proportional to the number of counts; see,
e.g., Eq. (D1) in Appendix D.
Another interesting feature of our methodology is the dependence of the failure probability
on the observed value χ. As shown in Fig. 1 and Table I, given a fixed failure probability
ε, the fluctuation deviation can be written as a constant multiplied by σ =
√
χ. One could
ask the opposite question that for a given fluctuation deviation of nασ, for a fixed value
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FIG. 2. Lower and upper bounds of the expectation value versus observed values of χ for the
Gaussian analysis (dotted) and our new method (solid). In both cases, the failure probability is
fixed at ε = 10−10.
of nα, how the failure probability would vary with χ. This question has been answered in
Corollary A.2 and the results have been shown in Fig. (3) for several different values of nα.
It can be seen that for large values of χ, the fluctuation probability approaches the constant
value given in Table I. For small values of χ, however, the failure probability goes up as now,
for the given confidence interval, the chance of making an error is higher. This is in contrast
with what the Gaussian analysis method assumes in that the failure probability for a fixed
value of nα is independent of χ; see Eq. (C3) in Appendix C. This is how our method offers
a more rigorous approach to the finite-key analysis as compared to the Gaussian analysis
method.
B. Key rate comparison
In order to compare the performance of our technique, in terms of the final key rate
and the maximum secure transmission distance, with previous work, we simulate our QKD
system by assuming that the observed values for different parameters of interest is given
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FIG. 3. The total failure probability ε versus the observed value χ when we fix the deviation from
the mean value is given by nασ, for nα = 3, 5, 7, 9 from top to bottom curves.
by their asymptotic values in an Eve-free experiment. These values have been summarized
below [23]:
Qa = Y0 + (1− Y0)(1− e−ηµa),
EaQa = e0Y0 + ed(Q
a − Y0),
(34)
where η is the total transmittance, Qa and Ea are the overall gain and QBER, ed is the
misalignment error rate, and the error rate of the background noise, e0, is equal to 1/2.
Note that the values used in Eq. (34) is for simulation purpose only. In a real experiment,
all the variables on the left hand side can directly be measured. For the simulation of the
asymptotic case with an infinite number of decoy states, where all the channel properties
can be estimated accurately, we use the following formula
Yi = 1− (1− Y0)(1− η)i,
eiYi = e0Y0 + ed(Yi − Y0),
(35)
where Yi and ei are the yield and the error rate of the i-photon channel.
In our numerical results, we optimize the choice of the intensities and the ratios of the
signal, weak decoy, and vacuum state to maximize the final key rate. To perform parameter
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optimization, the local search algorithm (LSA) [33] is employed. In the following simulation,
we use the parameters of a practical QKD system [34], as listed in Table II. Note that, in our
work, ε represents the failure probability of each step. In our method, the failure probability
of a single upper (lower) bound is ε/2 and therefore, the failure probability of a confidence
interval, composed of an upper bound and a lower bound, is ε. The total failure probability
of the whole QKD system (including both X and Z bases) is 8ε.
TABLE II. Parameters for a practical QKD system where ηd is the detection efficiency, f is the
inefficiency of error correction, and N is the number of pulses sent by Alice.
ηd Y0 f ed Loss ε N
4.5% 1.7× 10−6 1.22 3.3% 0.21 dB/km 10−10 1010
We compare the three discussed fluctuation analysis methods with the asymptotic case,
where, in the latter, the data size is infinitely large and its statistical fluctuations can be
ignored. The results are shown in Fig. 4. It is clear that our new method always provides a
larger final key rate than the Chernoff+Hoeffding method [24]. For N = 1010, our analysis
method increases the maximum secure transmission distance by 7 km. In the limit of short
transmission distances, the number of pulses detected by Bob is very large, and, therefore,
the improvement of our new method is not substantial. In the regime around the maximum
secure transmission distance, the value of χ is small and our new method is advantageous.
Meanwhile, from Fig. 4, one can clearly see that our new method achieves a very close
performance to the widely-used Gaussian analysis method [23].
For our method, at short QKD distances, the optimized intensity of the signal state µ is
equal to 0.45. As the distance increases, the optimum intensity of the signal state decreases.
At a distance of 100 km, the optimized µ decreases to 0.37 with other optimized parameters
listed in Table III. All the results are consistent with the Gaussian analysis case [23].
TABLE III. Optimized parameters at 100 km.
Key rate ν µ pν pµ
3.04 × 10−6 0.126 0.370 0.250 0.650
Finally, in Fig. 5, we consider the relation between the data size and the corresponding
maximum secure transmission distance for all three methods disucssed. When the total data
23
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
10−8
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
Transmission distance [km]
Ke
y 
ge
ne
ra
tio
n 
ra
te
 [p
er 
pu
lse
]
 
 
Our method
Asymptotic case
C+H method
Gaussian analysis
FIG. 4. Comparison of the key rates obtained by the three methods, the Gaussian analysis, the
Chernoff+Hoeffding method [24], and our new method. The infinite key length case is also shown
in this figure.
size of a QKD protocol is larger than 1014, its maximum secure transmission distance is very
close to the asymptotic limit of 142 km. No secret keys can be exchanged at a data size, N ,
roughly below 107. The curves of our method and the Gaussian case are almost the same.
When N is smaller than 1012, all three curves are very steep. Consequently, the gap between
maximum secure transmission distances of our method and the Chernoff+Hoeffding method
is distinct. For example, as shown in both Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, our method increases the
maximum transmission distance by 7 km when total data size N = 1010.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we developed a tight bound for the decoy-state QKD system when the finite-
data-size effects are taken into account. As compared to the early work on this topic, which
relied on Gaussian approximations, our method offered a rigorous approach to estimating
the failure probability. In that sense, our method was similar to the recently proposed
techniques relying on Chernoff and Hoeffding inequalities. Our proposed method could,
24
106 108 1010 1012 1014 1016
Total data size N
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
M
ax
im
al
 tr
an
sm
is
si
on
 d
ist
an
ce
 [K
m]
Gaussian case
Our method
C+H method
FIG. 5. Maximum secure transmission distance versus the number of pluses sent by Alice, N . The
simulation parameters are listed in Table III. No secure keys can be generated for N ≤ 107. The
asymptotic limit for the maximum secure transmission distance is 142 km when N ≥ 1014.
however, substantially improve the performance by yielding a smaller failure probability, for
a similar confidence interval, than what the Chernoff+Hoeffding method could offer. In fact,
after parameter optimization, our method could offer similar performance to the widely-used
Gaussian analysis method, which uses non-rigorous Gaussian approximations.
There are several problems to which our methodology can be applied. In this work, we
assumed that the phase of the weak coherent state was continuously randomized. When
the phase is not randomized, we know that security loopholes may allow for certain attacks
[35, 36]. In practice, it is difficult to randomize the phase of a laser pulse continuously.
Instead one can apply the discrete phase randomization [37], using which the final secure
key rate is slightly reduced. Our finite-key analysis for the decoy-state method can then be
applied to the discrete phase randomization case. Our method is also applicable to the biased
BB84 protocol [38], in which the choice of basis is not symmetric. The analysis method in
this work can also be used in other protocols, such as measurement-device-independent QKD
protocol [39, 40] and round-robin differential-phase-shift QKD protocol [41, 42]. We expect
that our methodology will offer similar performance to the Gaussian analysis method, while
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the security parameters have been rigorously estimated. In addition to finite-size effects,
laser source intensity fluctuations should also be taken into consideration in practice [43, 44].
It is important to investigate all these practical issues together for QKD systems.
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Appendix A: From χ to χ¯
1. Chernoff bound method
In this section, we provide a confidence interval for the expectation value χ¯ based on
the observed value χ. We use the methodology described in Sec. III B and the original
forms of the Chernoff bound in Eqs. (19) and (20). Our proposed method works even if
χ approaches 0, and unlike the Chernoff+Hoesffding method, we do not need to use the
Hoeffding inequality in this regime. Without loss of generality, we assume that the failure
probabilities for Events 1 and 2 are equal and are given by ε/2. the total failure probability
in bounding the expected values is then given by ε. As mentioned in Sec. III B, the lower and
upper bounds on χ¯ can be obtained by, respectively, solving the following set of equations:
g(δL, χ¯) = [
eδ
L
(1 + δL)1+δL
]χ¯ = ε/2,
χ¯ =
χ
1 + δL
,
δL ≥ 0,
(A1)
and
g(−δU , χ¯) = [ e
−δU
(1− δU)1−δU ]
χ¯ = ε/2,
χ¯ =
χ
1− δU ,
0 < δU < 1,
(A2)
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or equivalently, for given values of χ and ε, we need to solve the following two equations
g(δL, χ/(1 + δL)) = ε/2
g(−δU , χ/(1− δU)) = ε/2
(A3)
to obtain δL and δU . The lower and upper bounds of E[χ] are then given by
E
L[χ] =
χ
1 + δL
,
E
U [χ] =
χ
1− δU .
(A4)
Claim A.1. For all χ > 0, there exist unique answers for δL > 0 and 0 < δU < 1 in
Eq. (A3).
Proof. Let us first rewrite Eq. (A3) as follows:
g2(δ
L) = ln(1 + δL)− δL/(1 + δL) = β/χ,
g2(−δU) = ln(1− δU) + δU/(1− δU) = β/χ,
(A5)
where β = − ln(ε/2) ≥ 0. It is easy to verify that g2(0) = 0, g2(∞) =∞, and g2(−1) =∞.
This would guarantee that there exists solutions for δL and δU in their respective regions.
Furthermore, it can be verified that g2(δ) is a monotonic function of δ in both regions of
−1 < δ < 0 and δ > 0. This guarantees that the solutions found are unique. This would
imply that the corresponding lower and upper bounds in Eq. (A4) would provide us with
the tightest bound possible in Eqs. (24) and (26).
Corollary A.2. For a given observed value χ and a confidence interval [EL[χ],EU [χ]], the
failure probability is given by
ε = e−χg2(δ
L) + e−χg2(−δ
U ), (A6)
where δL and δU can be obtained from Eq. (A4).
Proof. From Eq. (A5), the values of βL (βU) can be calculated as follows
βL = χg2(δ
L),
βU = χg2(−δU).
(A7)
From their definition, we also have βL = − ln(εL) and βU = − ln(εU), where εL (εU) is the
corresponding failure probability to Event 1 (2), which results in
εL = e−χg2(δ
L),
εU = e−χg2(−δ
U ).
(A8)
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The failure probability of the given confidence interval, ε, is then given by εL + εU =
e−χg2(δ
L) + e−χg2(−δ
U ).
Claim A.3. In the limit of χ→∞, the lower and upper bounds of χ¯ in Eq. (A4) are given
by,
E
L[χ] = χ(1−
√
2β
χ
),
E
U [χ] = χ(1 +
√
2β
χ
).
(A9)
Proof. For large values of χ, β/χ is small, and therefore the corresponding solutions for δL
and δU would be small too. In this regime, one can use the Taylor series for the log function,
up to two terms, to simplify Eq. (A5) to obtain
δL = δU =
√
2β
χ
. (A10)
The conclusion will follow if we replace the above answer into Eq. (A4).
2. Simplified result when χ is large
In Appendix A1, we showed how to tightly bound the expectation value χ¯. The above
numerical method can, however, become tedious when χ is very large. To overcome this
problem, we use the symmetric form of the Chernoff bound in Eq. (32) and give an explicit
result in the specific case of χ > 6β.
Claim A.4. For χ > 6β, the lower and upper bounds of χ¯ are given by
E
L[χ] =
χ
1 + δ
,
E
U [χ] =
χ
1− δ ,
δ =
3β +
√
8βχ+ β2
2(χ− β) .
(A11)
Proof. As shown in Sec. III B, we need to solve the following equations
2e−(δ
L)2χ¯/(2+δL) = ε,
χ¯ =
χ
1 + δL
, 0 < δL < 1,
(A12)
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and
2e−(δ
U )2χ¯/(2+δU ) = ε,
χ¯ =
χ
1− δU , 0 < δ
U < 1,
(A13)
whose positive roots are obtained to be
δL =
3β +
√
8βχ+ β2
2(χ− β) ,
δU =
√
8βχ+ 9β2 − β
2(χ+ β)
.
(A14)
In order to have 0 < δU , δL < 1, the value of χ should be larger than 6β. One can in
principle use the above equations for δL and δU to find the corresponding lower and upper
bounds for χ¯. In Eq. (A11), we have used a symmetric form for the deviation parameter by
choosing δ = δL for both lower and upper bounds. This sysmmteric form would give us a
slightly looser upper bound as it can be shown that δU is smaller than δL. In the limit of
χ → ∞, the above symmetric formulation would nevertheless give us the same asymptotic
values as obtained in Claim A.2, which indicates that the two methodologies are more or
less the same for large values of χ.
Appendix B: Random sampling
Here, we review the standard random sampling method used for the phase error rate
estimation [45]. Suppose there are nx + nz qubits (or basis-independent quantum states)
in total. Alice and Bob randomly pick nx qubits, measured in the X basis, and obtain a
bit error rate of ebx. They need to estimate the phase error rate, epz, for the remaining
nz qubits measured in the Z basis. When the data size is infinite, for basis-independent
states, epz = ebx. When statistical fluctuations are taken into account, a deviation θ is
expected between the two error rates. According to the random sampling analysis, the
(failure) probability for epz ≥ ebx + θ is given by [45]
Pr(epz ≥ ebx + θ) ≤
√
nx + nz√
ebx(1− ebx)nxnz
2−(nx+nz)ξ(θ), (B1)
where ξ(θ) = h(ebx + θ − qxθ)− qxh(ebx)− (1− qx)h(ebx + θ) and qx = nx/(nx + nz). For a
given failure probability ε, one can then numerically find θ that satisfies
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ε =
√
nx + nz√
ebx(1− ebx)nxnz
2−(nx+nz)ξ(θ). (B2)
In the decoy-state scheme considered here, we can use the above random sampling method
to upper bound θ, by using the following substitutions
ebx → ebxU1
epz → epsz1
nx →MxL1
nz →MzsL1
(B3)
in Eq. (B2). The upper bound of the phase error rate epsz1 is then given by
epszU1 = e
bxU
1 + θ. (B4)
Note that in order to estimate the phase error rate in the Z-basis signal states, we can use
all the data points in the X basis. That is why we use MxL1 rather than M
xsL
1 in Eq. (B3).
Appendix C: Gaussian analysis
Here, we summarize the Gaussian analysis method in Ref. [23, 46], where the quantum
channel is assumed to fluctuate according to a Gaussian distribution. According to the
central limit theorem, a lower bound of y1, an upper bound of e1y1 and hence, an upper
bound of e1 can be obtained by
min y1, s.t.,
(1− nα√
Ma
)Qa ≤ e−µaY0 + · · ·+ e−µa (µa)
i
i!
Yi + · · · ≤ (1 + nα√
Ma
)Qa,
a ∈ {s, w, v}.
(C1)
max e1y1, s.t.,
(1− nα√
EaMa
)EaQa ≤ e−µae0Y0 + · · ·+ e−µa (µa)
i
i!
eiYi + · · · ≤ (1 + nα√
EaMa
)EaQa,
a ∈ {s, w, v}.
(C2)
The number of standard deviation nα in Eq. (C1) is directly related to the failure probability,
1− erf(nα/
√
2) = ε, (C3)
where erf(x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt is the error function [47].
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Appendix D: Chernoff+Hoeffding method
In [24], the parameter χ¯ is estimated by Chernoff+Hoeffding method. While in our
method we use the Chernoff bound for all positive values of χ, in [24], the authors use the
Hoeffding inequality when the date size is small. In this section, we denote µ to be χ¯. Then
χ can be written as µ+δ, where δ ∈ [−∆, ∆̂]. The parameters ε1, ε2 and ε3 are, respectively,
the failure probabilities of the lower bound with the Hoeffding inequality, the lower bound
estimation of the Chernoff bound, and the upper bound estimation of the Chernoff bound.
First, a general lower bound µL is given according to the Hoeffding inequality.
µL = χ−
√
n ln(1/ε1)/2, (D1)
where n is the total number of random variables χi and χ =
∑n
i=1 χi. This lower bound is
used to determine the estimated means of the Chernoff+Hoeffding method.
With the upper bound µL in Eq. (D1), the following three tests are performed:
1. test1: (2ε−12 )
1/µL ≤ e(4/4
√
2)2
2. test2: (ε−13 )
1/µL < e1/3
3. test3: ((ε3)
1/µL) < e[(2e−1)/2]
2
According to the results of these tests, the upper bound and lower bound are estimated
with different means. If a test is fulfilled, the according bound can be calculated with
Chernoff bound, which gives a tighter estimation. When no tests is fulfilled, the according
bound have to be calculated by the looser Hoeffding inequality.
When estimating the upper bound, we denote that µU = χ+∆. According to the result
of test1, the value of ∆ is given by,
1. when test1 is fulfilled, ∆ = g(χ, ε42/16), where g(x, y) =
√
2x ln(y−1);
2. when test1 is not fulfilled, ∆ =
√
n/2 ln(1/ε2)
When considering the lower bound, we denote that µL = χ− ∆̂. According to the results
of test2 and test3, the value of ∆̂ is given by
1. When test2 is fulfilled, ∆̂ = g(χ, ε
3/2
3 )
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2. When test2 is not fulfilled, but test3 is fulfilled, ∆̂ = g(χ, ε23)
3. When test3 is not fulfilled (test2 is also not fulfilled), ∆̂ =
√
n/2 ln(1/ε3)
Corollary D.1. When all of the tests are fulfilled, ε3 = ε2 = ε/2, and χ → ∞, the
confidence interval of χ¯ in Eq. (A11) is given by,
E
L[χ] = χ(1−
√
3β
χ
),EU [χ] = χ(1 + 2
√
2β − ln 2
χ
). (D2)
Proof.
When all of the tests are fulfilled, we know that:
χ¯L(χ) = χ− g(χ, ε3/23 ) = χ(1−
√
3β
χ
),
χ¯U(χ) = χ+ g(χ, ε42/16) = χ(1 + 2
√
2β − ln 2
χ
).
(D3)
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